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I.  Introduction 
There can be no doubting the increasing importance of central banks to processes of 
international economic management.1
 
  Whilst the names of prominent central bankers may 
be less well known than those of politicians, and whilst the functions their banks perform 
receive scant public recognition, the decisions taken by central bankers have a significant 
bearing on the conduct of everyday life. 
Academic studies of central banking typically divide into one of two traditions.  For 
some, central bankers have shown that, once trusted to operate policy autonomously, they 
can consistently deliver low and stable inflation at no obvious cost in terms of output and 
employment.2
For others, however, this is to over-emphasise the economic dimension of CBI.  A 
rather different line of argument is also evident within the literature.  Whilst casting doubt 
on the empirical fact that CBI leads necessarily to superior policy performance, authors in 
this latter tradition suggest that this is not, in any case, the main issue.
 The analysis of central bank independence (hereafter CBI) is thus reduced to 
a discussion of the technical efficiency of the policy-making process.  Given the presumed 
efficiency of CBI, it is usual for authors in this tradition to express a normative preference 
for CBI over alternative institutional arrangements for the conduct of monetary policy. 
3 Instead, they focus 
on CBI as a political strategy, whereby certain societal demands for price stability are 
provided with an institutional guarantor.  Such demands are clearly political in nature; yet, 
through CBI, they are insulated from political contestation. Since such insulation 
undermines the ability to challenge the economic basis of the prevailing social structure, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that authors who insist on a more political reading of CBI are less 
likely to argue the case for increased central bank independence than those who adopt a 
more economic reading. 
 2 
The aim of this article is to review the contribution of the books listed above to our 
understanding of the process of CBI. Each raises a number of significant implications for 
the study of central banking that take the reader to the heart of the disputes which divide 
the literature.  My review is based around three core themes.  Firstly, I analyse the 
genealogy of ideas about CBI, paying particular attention to the significance of the 
disciplinary origins of those ideas.  Secondly, I suggest likely sources of institutional 
dysfunctionality arising from increased CBI.  Thirdly, I argue that the real motivation for 
CBI, given these institutional pathologies-in-waiting, are primarily domestic and political 
rather than global and economic. I conclude that the current trend towards CBI may lead to 
important sources of policy failure in the future. 
 
II. Understanding CBI: Preferences, Institutions and Ideas 
CBI and Orthodox Economic Analysis 
The core of the intellectual case for CBI revolves around the assumption of a 
persistent inflationary bias built into politicians’ monetary policy preferences.  It is argued 
that this bias can only be negated by vesting authority in policy-makers who can be trusted 
to choose a policy rule that is non-accommodating of inflationary tendencies; namely 
central bankers.4  Central bankers are assumed to be better placed than politicians to 
enforce such a rule, since there is no clear symmetry of interest between the central bank 
and the labour market in the way that there is between the government and the labour 
market.  Whilst legitimacy is conferred upon governments by voters in popular elections, 
central bankers only need satisfy a much smaller group of actors concentrated within 
financial markets in order to enhance their reputations.  As such, central bankers are 
assumed to be less constrained by social pressures for accommodating inflation.  This 
ensures that they can commit more ‘credibly’ than governments to operating monetary 
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policy in line with a low inflation equilibrium and, as a result, produce superior inflation 
performance.  So the argument goes. 
There are two broad political economy challenges to this standard economic 
conclusion: one empirical, the other conceptual.  The first empirically focused challenge 
suggests that CBI leads to superior inflation performance only when it is accompanied by 
labour market institutions that facilitate solidaristic wage bargaining.  This work attempts 
to increase the explanatory power of the orthodox model of monetary policy-making by 
adding further institutional variables to those that relate solely to the legal status of the 
central bank.  In contrast, the second and more theoretical challenge suggests that the 
orthodox economics account of CBI mis-specifies the whole nature of monetary relations 
within contemporary capitalism.  This work attempts to recast the very basis of orthodox 
explanations of monetary policy-making. 
 
CBI and Wage Bargaining Institutions: Iversen, Pontusson and Soskice 
Of the books under review, the collection edited by Iversen et al constitutes the most 
notable empirical challenge to the assumption of a simple correlation between CBI and 
superior inflation performance.  The volume seeks to emphasise “institutional interaction 
across different political-economic arenas” (Iversen and Pontusson [IPS], p. 2), suggesting 
that “linear models [of inflation performance] fail because they are not sufficiently 
attentive to the consequences of [such] interaction” (p. 19; see also Soskice [IPS], p. 40).  
Particular attention is paid to the way in which differences in the wage bargaining process 
can lead to different inflation outcomes, even in the presence of identical central bank 
inflation preferences.  The logic is that wage bargainers are assumed to be able to socialise 
the costs of inflationary pay demands in the context of encompassing labour market 
institutions (Franzese and Hall [IPS]; Iversen [IPS]).  Such institutions are shown to act as 
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a further restraint on inflation over and above that which can be attributed to the formal 
independence of the central bank.  Given such a logic, it may even be the case that central 
banks can be too independent to ensure efficient economic outcomes in such 
circumstances.  The implementation of a strict non-accommodating policy rule by the 
central bank may disrupt the solidaristic wage bargaining that has been a key component of 
the counter-inflationary culture associated with encompassing labour market institutions. 
Empirical evidence from Northern Europe suggests that a non-discretionary monetary 
policy exacerbates the conflict between different distributive interests within the wage 
bargaining structure.  This has led to a reduction in solidaristic wage behaviour, as 
individualistic concerns increasingly dominate the wage bargain.  The ensuing collapse of 
wage solidarism can lead to greater inflationary pressures being exacted through the pay 
structure – a perverse outcome of the central bank attempting to enforce a strict non-
accommodating monetary rule (Iversen and Pontusson [IPS], pp. 18-21). 
There is much to commend in the technical detail of the contributions to Iversen et al, 
and there is also much to admire in the way in which the individual authors render 
problematic many of the core conclusions of the orthodox economics literature on central 
bank independence.  However, it is still questionable whether the volume represents a 
fundamental critique of the orthodoxy.  For, the applied institutional analysis contained 
therein accepts key features of the conceptual framework in which the orthodoxy is 
grounded.5
Specifically, the idea that there is both an inflationary bias originating within the 
political process and an institutional fix for such a bias is a recurring theme throughout the 
volume.  It challenges orthodox conclusions of the nature of the institutional fix, but not 
the underlying assumption of its existence.  Consequently, inflationary outcomes continue 
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to be thought of as the product of institutionally ‘inefficient’ policies; the only real dispute 
is over the source of the inefficiency. 
In this respect, monetary policy decisions remain overwhelmingly technical 
decisions, as politics is reduced to the struggle for the authority to impose efficient 
institutions for monetary policy-making.  Whilst the Iversen et al volume contains many 
notable accounts of developments in both domestic party systems and the international 
economy that may constrain successful institutional reform, the conception of politics as 
the search for efficient institutions is one to which most orthodox economists would 
subscribe. 
 
CBI and the Politics of Ideas: Arestis and Sawyer 
There is, however, another body of economic work that questions, indeed rejects, the 
notion that monetary policy exists in a purely technical realm.  Drawing on his experience 
as both academic and central banker, Alan Blinder suggests that the key to understanding 
CBI is to uncover the political dynamics that remain hidden within formal macroeconomic 
models of monetary policy-making.  For Blinder, the politics of macroeconomics is not so 
much the struggle for the authority to impose efficient institutions, as it is the struggle to 
legitimise self-appointed authority on the basis of technical expertise. 
Orthodox macroeconomists seek to sustain their authoritative voice in advocating 
CBI on the basis of claims that this will maximise the social welfare function.  Yet, as 
Blinder argues, the social welfare function bears no objective form beyond its dominant 
social construction.6  It appears in orthodox models of CBI in precise mathematical terms, 
and the precision of the mathematical structure creates the impression that the function can 
be solved and an optimal policy then designed.  However, the ‘solution’ that is offered 
exists only at the level of formal mathematical logic; the social welfare function has no 
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explicit economic meaning that can be ascertained empirically before being used as the 
basis for policy.7
Yet, this question cannot be asked within an orthodox intellectual framework that 
denies the constitutive role of politics in the economy.  Within orthodox macroeconomic 
analysis the social welfare function is said to approximate the policy preferences of the 
‘representative’ individual within society.
  Thus, the most important question to ask about the process of central 
banking is who defines the social welfare function that acts as the guide for central bank 
interventions in the economy? 
8
The major contribution of the Arestis and Sawyer volume is to deepen the conceptual 
challenge to these orthodox economic arguments.  The orthodox case rests on the 
assumption that monetary policy-making institutions become efficient the more that they 
are deemed to be ‘credible’.  Credibility is conferred upon institutions by the public, who 
are thus granted some sort of veto over the success of policy.  If the public does not believe 
that policy-makers will abide by their commitments to price stability, it will not adjust its 
behaviour in line with announcements of counter-inflationary policy, and such policy will 
fail. 
  However, those models conceptualise the 
representative individual as one who adopts the same cognitive approach to the question of 
monetary policy-making as that of orthodox macroeconomists.  By little more than a 
definitional trick, orthodox macroeconomists are thus able to elevate themselves to the 
position of legitimate intellectual guardians of society’s concerns for the key settings of 
economic management.  The intellectual case for CBI is therefore less clear than its current 
political appeal would seem to suggest. 
Yet, as Ilene Grabel argues ([AS], p. 90), a number of conditions must be met for 
standard credibility theory to be an accurate reflection of actual practice.  Firstly, all market 
agents must derive the same knowledge about the economy for the public to act 
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collectively in this way.  Secondly, this knowledge must be correct.  Thirdly, it must fit 
with a standard neoclassical account of the nature of the inflation/unemployment trade-off.  
Fourthly, this account must also be correct.  If any of these conditions fail to be met, the 
standard intellectual case for orthodox monetary policy cannot be sustained.  Yet, given 
opinion poll data that show consistent public confusion about the very nature of inflation,9
Moreover, as Keith Bain points out, a further assumption is required if it is to be 
argued that only an independent central bank can enforce a credible counter-inflationary 
policy.  Governments are assumed to be less able to implement a non-accommodating 
policy rule because electoral considerations mean that it will always be willing to trade-off 
more inflation for less unemployment.  Yet, there is no long-run inflation/unemployment 
trade-off in the neoclassical model, only a natural rate of unemployment at which prices are 
stable.
 
it is difficult to understand why we should expect any of these conditions to hold.  If the 
representative individual does not even know what inflation is, it is unlikely that the public 
will be equipped with perfect knowledge of the government’s inflation preferences. 
10
Indeed, that case is completely dissolved when we recall that it is grounded in the 
assertion that governments have political incentives to be lax in the control of the money 
  Given the conditions listed above, the assumption of perfect knowledge 
guarantees that all market agents know this to be the case.  As such, it is necessary to add 
the further assumption that individuals form their expectations differently as voters than as 
market agents; in effect, that the act of voting initiates a temporary collective delusion on 
the part of all market agents.  In the absence of such an assumption, it would be impossible 
to explain why individuals would vote for a government that would attempt to trade-off 
more inflation for less unemployment in a manner that they, as market agents, know to be 
impossible (Bain [AS], pp. 90-1).  However, without this assumption, the orthodox case for 
CBI begins to fall apart. 
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supply, whereas central bankers can ensure monetary discipline because they do not.11
Moreover, despite the shared economic ideology of these two sets of actors, financial 
managers will disrupt the central bank’s inflation strategy by generating new sources of 
endogenous money growth so long as they believe it to be in their interests to do so.  Banks 
add to the money supply whenever additional demand for money makes such action 
profitable (Aybar and Harris [AS], p. 25).  Thus, there is no simple one-to-one link between 
central bank policy and money supply growth and, as such, there can be no simple one-to-
one link between central bank policy and inflation performance.  Yet, the whole rationale 
for CBI is based on the assumption of such a link.  Given such flawed economic reasoning 
the likely long-term implications of such inappropriate institutional changes are likely to be 
neither optimal nor efficient. 
  For, 
this is fundamentally to misunderstand the nature of the money supply within 
contemporary capitalism.  A central bank can never have complete control over the money 
supply, irrespective of the extent of its independence, because complete control is not its to 
have.  An important element of money growth is endogenous to the financial system.  As 
Sheila Dow and Carlos Rodríguez-Fuentes argue ([AS], p. 1), “an endogenous money 
supply…means that monetary policy, using whatever instrument, does not determine the 
money stock but is only one of its multiple determinants”.  As such, the introduction of 
inflationary pressures into the economy originates not only with the decisions of central 
bankers, but also with those of financial managers within the private sector. 
 
III. CBI, Path-Dependence, and ‘the Poverty of Theory’ 
The Problem with a ‘General’ Theory … 
Social scientists have become increasingly interested in the path-dependent nature of 
political processes, particularly in circumstances in which those processes are bounded by 
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institutional ‘norms’.12
Economists may well claim that contemporary credibility theory provides a general 
theory of inflation that allows them to identify the ideal institutional framework for 
controlling inflationary tendencies.  Yet, claims for the existence of a general theory of 
inflation are far from new, having appeared at frequent intervals within the economics 
literature.  However, each time a general theory has been identified, it has been a different 
‘general’ theory, which means that none of them have been actual, time-invariant, general 
theories at all.  Given this, it may be necessary to question the very notion of a general 
theory of inflation.  For, if the price level is subjected to a range of different inflationary 
pressures, the notion of a translocal institutional fix becomes highly problematic. 
  Under conditions of path-dependence, patterns of behaviour 
consistent with the institutional norm become the subject of routine reproduction, often to 
the point of becoming locked in.  The timing of institutional reform therefore has 
significant long-run consequences, because it is usual to base reform on attempts to embed 
the dominant norm of the day.  Whilst the prevailing norm may only be temporary, once 
institutionally embedded it is likely to continue to influence behaviour.  In this section, I 
argue that the recent trend towards CBI may prove to have path-dependent effects – many 
of which will have perverse economic consequences.  CBI can only be more than a 
temporary palliative to inflation if it is an institutional reflection of a general theory of 
inflation which is universally applicable across all points of time and space, rather than a 
reaction to contingent political events.  It is my contention that the latter characterisation is 
the more appropriate. 
 
A Genealogy of Inflated Ideas? 
The twentieth century was unusually inflation-prone compared with those that 
preceded it.  However, this was not a simple linear expansion in the price level.  
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Inflationary pressures may have persisted, but the nature of those pressures changed over 
time.  These are developments on which the existing literature on CBI says little.  Much of 
that literature is concerned only with quantitative rather than qualitative indices of inflation.  
It focuses upon changes in the value of inflation, whilst neglecting changes in its type.  Yet, 
if we compare different decades in the post-war period, we find that economists’ ideas 
concerning what inflation was and what it was caused by changed over time.  Somewhat 
predictably in such circumstances, assumptions about the necessary institutional reform to 
quell inflationary pressures also changed. 
Heuristic distinctions can be drawn to highlight perceived changes in the experience 
of inflation in the post-war period.  In the 1960s, inflationary pressures were assumed to 
result from balance of payments disparities as different economies embedded rather 
different Fordist production structures within the wider context of the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange rate regime.  The proposed institutional solution was to reconfigure international 
monetary relations in line with more flexible exchange rates and enable different 
productivity rates to be absorbed in changing currency prices, rather than in the price of 
consumer goods.13
In the 1970s, inflationary pressures were assumed to result from one-off supply 
shocks that exacerbated increasing technological obsolescence at the end of the Fordist era, 
coupled with overly optimistic assumptions about the nature of the inflation-unemployment 
trade-off.  The proposed institutional solution was to create additional policy-making 
capacities able to sustain prolonged periods of crisis management whilst the shift to a new 
technological-economic paradigm was negotiated.
 
14
In the 1980s, inflationary pressures were assumed to result from supply rigidities 
within the labour market that led to cost increases above the rate of productivity growth 
and, as a consequence, wage-push inflation.  The proposed institutional solution was to 
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engage in labour market reform to restrict the access of trade unions to the wage 
negotiating process and, hence, to provide a disciplinary anchor for wage increases.15
In the 1990s, inflationary pressures were assumed to result from financial market 
actors failing to confer a reputation for counter-inflationary credibility onto domestic 
monetary policy-makers.  The proposed institutional solution was to provide a policy-
making context that tied the hands of governments by creating an external enforcement 
mechanism for counter-inflationary policy.
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As such, it was only in the 1990s that assumptions about the prevailing type of 
inflation led to arguments for CBI.  Moreover, not all countries experienced the conditions 
that are conventionally assumed to necessitate central bank independence to the same 
degree during that decade.  Inflation shocks take on markedly different characteristics in 
different economies (Chadha and Janssen [AS], p. 164), depending on the organisation of 
those economies.  In fact, even in circumstances in which two economies display identical 
numerical inflation rates, there is no guarantee that they will be sharing the same 
inflationary experience. 
 
Such a conclusion is almost entirely lost within the orthodox economics literature.  
Much of the existing empirical work on inflation differences tends to focus simply on the 
legal status of the central bank.  Yet, as Marta Campillo and Jeffrey Miron argue, once the 
model of inflation performance is extended to include other variables relating to the 
organisation of the economy as a whole, “institutional arrangements [relating to CBI] play 
almost no role in determining inflation outcomes”.  The implications of this finding are 
clear.  As Campillo and Miron themselves conclude, their results “suggest that quick fixes 
[in terms of increasing CBI] do not make a big difference unless the underlying conditions 




Mayer and the Poverty of (Trans)historicism 
At most, then, credibility theories of monetary policy-making can explain the 
inflationary experiences of the 1990s, but only in some instances and then only partially.  
Increases in the independence of the central bank therefore represent a widespread 
institutional response that is only consistent with particular inflationary experiences which 
themselves are strictly limited in both time and space.  However, assuming the existence of 
path-dependent institutional norms, the effects of moving to a monetary policy regime 
dominated by CBI are likely to be felt long after the conditions which were thought to 
necessitate that independence have faded.  Existing institutional arrangements tend to lock 
in certain patterns of behaviour, by filtering out alternative policy proposals that go against 
the institutional norm.  So long as prevailing institutional arrangements are reproduced, it 
may be expected that future policy responses to inflationary pressures will resemble current 
policy responses, even in circumstances in which the current institutional norm is only 
appropriate to inflationary pressures that are no longer present. 
Of course, we have no means of predicting the way in which future price trends will 
play themselves out, nor the form that future inflationary tendencies will take.  However, 
should factors other than reputation for counter-inflationary credibility dominate the 
emergence of inflationary tendencies in the future, current institutional provisions for CBI 
may become increasingly dysfunctional.  Institutional reforms cast solely in the image of 
credibility theories will therefore be likely to inject new sources of contradiction into the 
process of economic management within contemporary capitalism. 
Indeed, institutionalised policy-making cast in the image of any ‘general’ theory of 
inflation is likely to prove contradictory whenever the contextually-specific determinants of 
inflation change.  This, at any rate, would appear to be the main conclusion of Thomas 
Mayer’s account of the inflationary experience of the 1970s in the United States.  Mayer 
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asks whether the experience of the ‘Great Inflation’ can be understood in terms of the 
evolution of perfectly efficient monetary policy-making institutions.  He concludes (p. 49) 
that it cannot.  Rather, he focuses on the extent to which popular assumptions that extant 
institutional arrangements were already efficient led to clearly sub-optimal policy 
outcomes. 
Mayer’s primary contribution to our understanding of the process of central banking 
is to highlight the degree to which central bankers are guided by the ideas of economists.  
He shows that Federal Reserve governors hardly ever challenged either staff forecasts or 
the reasoning on which they were based (pp. 18-19); that the ideas of economists thus 
became deeply embedded as an institutionalised ‘common-sense’ (p. 92); and that policy 
was consequently slow to adjust to the emergence of qualitatively new inflationary 
pressures (pp. 119-24).18
Of course, the ideas on which orthodox economists base their general theories of 
inflation today are very different to those of their predecessors in the 1970s.  However, the 
technical details are not the most significant aspect of the debate.  It is more important to 
note that, of all the social sciences, intellectual consensus is most prevalent within 
economics.
  The economists who were advising the Federal Reserve believed 
both that they had intimate knowledge of the nature of the inflationary process and that 
institutional capabilities were already in place to tackle inflationary pressures at source. 
19  At frequent intervals, the economics profession has converged on a single 
explanatory model of the economy, and has been slow to adapt that model when the 
material conditions that underpinned its applicability have changed.  In circumstances in 
which institutional capacities have been cast in the image of the dominant model, changing 
economic conditions have tended to be met by policy-making inertia.  This was certainly 
true in the 1970s, when an embedded belief in the existence of a Phillips curve trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment led to a deterioration in economic performance 
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following a change in the nature of inflationary pressures.  It is a sobering thought that it 
may come true again, with attendant sources of potential policy failure, following recent 
experiments with central bank independence. 
Given all this, if orthodox arguments for CBI, even those which incorporate other 
variables such as ‘politics’ and ‘wage bargaining institutions’, replicate the same 
questionable reasoning, why then would governments buy into such a logic?  No definitive 
answer to this question can be given.  Yet, a reasonable case can be made for two related 
political, as opposed to economic, problems that CBI solves for politicians: externalising 
distributional problems and providing an automatic pilot for potentially unpopular policies. 
 
IV. Political Logics for CBI? 
Domestic Distribution and CBI 
Whilst much has been written about CBI and the need for ‘market sensitive’ policies 
within contemporary capitalism, little effort has been made to analyse the implications of 
increased ‘market sensitivity’ for the distribution of power within society.  It is clear that 
financial markets have a significant impact on the way in which society is organised, since 
the allocation of credit is the sine qua non of distributional politics.  Consequently, when 
the decision to cede operational autonomy to central bankers is justified in terms of the 
need for market sensitive policies, it is equally clear that a particular way of organising 
society is being simultaneously constructed and defended against possible redefinition.  
The social basis of financial trading has changed markedly in recent years, and has changed 
in a way which is selective of a social structure of accumulation grounded in the monetary 
orthodoxy that CBI is designed to deliver. 
The most significant recent development in the internal operation of financial 
markets has been the increasing exposure of an ever greater number of people to dominant 
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patterns of market trading.  For some, such exposure has been consciously accepted 
through attempts to diversify savings away from simple interest earning bank accounts.  
For others, increased exposure has been less conscious, being an unintended consequence 
of having a mortgage and a private pension plan. 
The social basis of market sensitivity has therefore spread ever more widely 
throughout society.  In consequence, more people now have a direct material interest in the 
future health of the financial system.  Thus, the fact that more people are now exposed to 
dominant patterns of trading within financial markets corresponds to the likelihood that 
more will seek the implementation of the type of policies that independent central banks 
routinely introduce to bolster and support those patterns. 
Of course, the social basis of demands for orthodox monetary policies is by no means 
spread evenly throughout society.  Those with savings benefit from an accumulation 
strategy built upon monetary orthodoxy whilst those lacking such resources tend to be 
socially excluded.  As such, when central banks display continuing dependence on market 
sensitivity to inform their policy decisions, they thus become responsible for reinforcing 
prevailing patterns of social inclusion and exclusion. 
Indeed, this may be the very reason that many governments have ceded increased 
formal policy-making independence to their central banks.  By delegating policy-making 
powers to central bankers, governments have displaced responsibility for reproducing 
prevailing patterns of social inclusion and exclusion.  Formal CBI provides not only an 
institutional guarantor of monetary orthodoxy, but also a political guarantor allowing 
governments to avoid responsibility for the social consequences of the asymmetric 
distributions arising from monetary orthodoxy. 
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CBI: Automatic Pilot for Policy 
Understood this way, the reasons for increasing the level of CBI would appear to 
originate within domestic politics rather than the globalised economy.  Thus, we must treat 
with care the common assertion by politicians that CBI represents the means through which 
domestic monetary policy is de-politicised as a necessary response to the structural 
imperatives of globalisation.  Indeed, the very ideas of de-politicisation and global 
imperatives need careful examination. 
As is clear from the preceding discussion, monetary relations determine the way in 
which wealth is both held within, and distributed throughout, society.  As such, monetary 
relations can never be fully de-politicised.  Whilst central banks may have autonomy from 
the executive branch of government, central bankers do not act in isolation; they are part of 
a close-knit community that also includes academic economists, commercial bankers and 
other money managers.  These individuals tend to share common understandings of the 
‘needs’ of the economy at a particular moment in time.  In Blinder’s words, “central 
bankers are often tempted to ‘follow the markets’; that is, to deliver the interest rate path 
that the markets have embedded in asset prices”.20
Specifically, market actors discount future central bank policy on the assumption that 
shared constructions of economic ‘imperatives’ render future policy predictable; when 
central bankers subsequently deliver that policy, market expectations are fulfilled and prior 
patterns of market activity act as legitimation for current central bank policy.  Formal 
independence from partisan politics and general public opinion is therefore in no sense 
mirrored by informal independence from the opinions of those that operate within financial 
markets.  As such, CBI represents no mere response to existing economic constraints.  It is 






V.  Conclusions 
My conclusions fall into three categories: economic; institutional; and political.  
Firstly, the act of delegating policy-making responsibility to the central bank is justified by 
the assumptions that central bankers are less likely than governments to accommodate 
inflationary pressures, and that they are therefore more likely to control the growth of the 
money supply in line with a stable non-inflationary equilibrium. 
However, I have argued that this is fundamentally to misunderstand the process of 
credit creation within contemporary capitalism.  Money supply growth is determined as 
much by the actions of the private sector acting in its own interests as by the central bank 
acting in the public interest.  In such circumstances, no amount of CBI can ever be 
sufficient to render truly credible central bank announcements on the control of the money 
supply, because the money supply is not solely its to control.  So long as actors operating 
within the private sector retain the ability to create credit as a means of making profits, the 
money supply will continue to be political in a wider sense of the word.  The trend towards 
CBI is therefore not only built upon flawed economic theory, but a theory which is 
grounded in a flawed understanding of the very nature of the economy. 
Secondly, I have argued that the questionable economic reasoning on which the trend 
towards CBI is based leads to potentially inappropriate institutional design.  Monetary 
policy-making institutions have often reflected economists’ assurances that they have 
developed a ‘general’ theory of inflation.  However, the subsequent emergence of 
qualitatively new inflationary pressures has undermined such claims.  Doubts remain 
whether CBI is the optimal institutional response to current inflationary pressures; but, 
even if this proves to be the case, it is highly improbable that it will also provide the basis 
for the optimal response to future inflationary pressures.  Particular experiences of inflation 
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continue to be dominated by contextually-specific factors.  Whilst this remains so, the trend 
towards CBI has bequeathed a potentially inertial institutional apparatus appropriate to a 
merely contingent inflationary moment. 
Thirdly, I have argued that the debate about CBI must be understood in political as 
well as economic terms.  Although the trend towards CBI may create institutional 
capacities unsuited to future tasks of economic management, this may not be the most 
important point.  The decision to cede operational responsibility for the conduct of 
monetary policy should be seen as a statement of social intent.  It is a signal by the 
government that it will defend both a social structure of accumulation based on monetary 
orthodoxy and also the particular interests incorporated into that structure.  CBI therefore 
creates an institutional guarantor for the continued reproduction of the current balance of 
social forces both domestically and internationally.  The most notable outcome of the trend 
towards central bank independence is the reduction of the number of potential sites of 
resistance to the overall orientation of government economic policy. 
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